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The influence of peer rating information on supervisor performance ratings was investigated 
using a 2 x 2 x 2 crossed factorial experimental design.  Participants were undergraduate 
business students who assumed the role of “supervisor” and evaluated a fictitious “subordinate” 
whose performance was either good or poor.  Participants were given fictitious information about 
peer ratings (high or low) from either one or three co-workers.  As expected, peer rating 
information resulted in inflated performance ratings for poor performers and deflated ratings for 
good performers.  No differences in performance ratings were found for a single versus multiple 
peer ratings.  Contrary to expectations, rater personality characteristics (conscientiousness and 
agreeableness) did not moderate the influence of peer rating information on performance ratings.    
 





he use of multi-source performance appraisal systems that employ two or more sources of ratings of 
the same job incumbent have gained in popularity in recent years (cf. Beehr, T.A., Ivanitskaya, L., 
Hansen, C.P., Erofeev, D, & Gudanowski, D.M, 2001; London & Smither, 1995; Timmreck & 
Bracken, 1997).  For example, 360 degree feedback systems employ ratings from supervisors, co-workers (peers), 
customers and the job incumbent (self-ratings). The rationale for this approach is that employee performance can be 
more accurately assessed and is more likely to improve when the employee receives feedback from multiple rating 
sources rather than only from their immediate supervisor or manager.  Although initially used primarily for 
developmental purposes (London & Smither, 1995), the current trend is for multi-source ratings systems to be used 
in administrative decisions (Bohl, 1996; Greguras, Robie, Schleicher & Goff, 2003).  
 
The widespread use of multi-source performance appraisal systems raises questions about the potential 
influence among the various rating sources.  Ideally, performance ratings made by multiple sources should be 
independent of one another. Otherwise, there is little advantage of using multiple rating sources. For example, 
several studies have shown that when supervisors are given knowledge of (high) self-ratings prior to completing 
their own performance evaluation, the supervisor ratings are inflated (Klimoski & Inks, 1990; Shore & Tachshian, 
2007).  This occurs even in the absence of an expectation to provide feedback to the subordinate, suggesting that 
supervisors are influenced by self-rating information when conducting performance evaluations. Very little is known 
about the influence of peer ratings on supervisor ratings. Thus, the purpose of this study is to extend knowledge of 
multi-source rating influence by investigating the effects of peer rating information on supervisor performance 
ratings.   
 
For several reasons we expect that peer ratings will have an influence upon supervisor performance 
evaluations.  In many work situations co-workers have more frequent (i.e., daily) contact with one another than with 
their supervisor.  This is particularly true when work processes require that individuals work as a team or when work 
procedures are interdependent. Since co-workers often have greater opportunity to observe (and experience the 
effects of) one another’s performance than the supervisor, the supervisor is likely to rely on peer ratings as an 
information source when completing their performance evaluation.   
T 
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Although it is possible that peer ratings are influenced by friendship bias, it might be argued that self-
ratings are even more biased than peer ratings.  That is, a job incumbent is likely to be more motivated to inflate a 
self-rating in order to maximize potential personal gains than to inflate a peer rating. In a resource-constrained 
environment (e.g., limited promotional opportunities, finite pool of money for raises), the motivation to inflate self-
ratings would appear to be greater than for peer ratings.  Since research has shown that self-rating information 
influences supervisor ratings (Klimoski & Inks, 1990; Shore & Tashchian, 2007), we expect peer rating information 
to also impact on supervisor ratings.  
 
Thus, we expect that when raters (i.e., supervisors) are given knowledge of ratings made by peers (i.e., co-
workers who evaluated the same subordinate), they will assign performance ratings consistent with the peer ratings.  
This should occur regardless of the level of actual job performance.  That is, when raters are given knowledge that a 
poorly performing employee has been rated high by his/her peer(s), this should influence the raters to inflate their 
rating. Conversely, when raters are given knowledge that a good performer has been given a low rating by a peer(s), 
this should influence the raters to deflate their rating. 
 
Research on conformity has the potential to provide insight into the effects of peer ratings on supervisor 
performance ratings.  Pioneering studies by Ashe (1956) found that individuals often conform to the opinions of a 
group by making erroneous decisions in a line judgment task to a much greater extent than individuals working 
alone. The generality of the conformity effect has been demonstrated in recent studies in the U.S. and other countries 
(e.g., Amir, 1984; Neto, 1995; Nickolson, Cole & Rocklin, 1985) suggesting that conformity is a universal and 
robust phenomenon.   
 
One explanation for conformity, called informational social influence, is that individuals look to the 
opinions of others to determine the correct behavior, particularly in novel or ambiguous situations.  In the current 
study, participants (college students) were asked to evaluate the performance of another individual subsequent to 
being given knowledge of how either several peers or a single peer evaluated the same “subordinate”, creating the 
potential for information social influence. Unlike in the Asch paradigm where participants made judgments about 
line lengths (in which the correct answer was obvious), making judgments about job performance is a more 
subjective task which should increase the effects of information social influence.  
 
Furthermore, consistent with informational social influence theory, we would expect multiple peer ratings 
to have a greater impact on supervisor ratings than a single peer rating.  For example, if a group of peers all rate a 
co-worker high (or low), the supervisor should be likely to assume these ratings have greater validity (i.e., less bias) 
and be given more weight than a single peer rating. 
 
Thus, we hypothesized that: 
 
H1a: Performance ratings for a poorly performing subordinate will be more lenient when raters (i.e., supervisors) 
are given knowledge of high peer ratings than when peer ratings are low. 
 
H1b:  Performance ratings for a good performing subordinate will be lower when raters (i.e., supervisors) are 
given knowledge of low peer ratings than when peer ratings are high.      
 
H2:  Performance ratings will be more influenced by multiple peer ratings than by a single peer rating. 
 
A final purpose of the current study is to examine how certain personality characteristics influence the 
degree to which performance ratings are influenced by peer ratings.  One study reported that individuals high on 
agreeableness and low on conscientiousness were likely to provide lenient performance ratings (Bernardin, Cooke & 
Villanova, 2000). By extension, we would expect that individuals who are more agreeable (i.e., cooperative, 
sympathetic), less conscientiousness (i.e., less thorough and careful) to be particularly susceptible to normative 
social influence.   For example, in the case of a poor performer, we would expect highly agreeable and less 
conscientious raters to be more likely to conform to high peer ratings and produce lenient (i.e., inflated) performance 
ratings.  
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Thus we hypothesized that: 
 
H3: Agreeableness will moderate the relationship between peer rating information and performance ratings 
such that highly agreeable raters will demonstrate greater conformity with peer ratings than less agreeable 
raters.  
 
H4: Conscientiousness will moderate the relationship between peer rating information and performance ratings 







Participants were 120 men (47%) and women students enrolled in business courses at a regional state 




A 2 x 2 x 2 crossed factorial design was employed. The independent variables were peer evaluation (low, 
high), and performance level (poor, good) and number of peer ratings (1 or 3).  The dependent variable consisted of 




Data were gathered during class sessions.  Approximately the same number of participants were randomly 
assigned to the 8 experimental conditions.  Each participant was asked to assume the role of “supervisor” and 
evaluate the performance of another individual (“subordinate”) described as an undergraduate student who 
purportedly completed a clerical task. The gender of the “subordinate” was held constant (male) so as not to 
introduce additional gender effects into the design. In actuality there was no “subordinate”; the clerical task the 
participant evaluated was fictitious.  
 
The scenario utilized was similar to the one used in prior research on self-ratings (e.g., Klimoski & Inks; 
1990; Shore & Tashchian, 2007).  The participants were told that another student had completed a clerical task that 
involved looking up catalogue numbers and suggested retail prices for 40 items from a merchandise catalogue. In 
addition, the “subordinate” was to calculate a 15%-off sale price for each item. Participants were provided with an 
answer key to score the “subordinate’s” work.  After determining the number of incorrect responses, participants 
were given additional information about peer ratings (described below) and then completed their performance 




Prior to completing the performance evaluation of their “subordinate”, participants were given fictitious 
information about how either one (male) or three other co-workers (two males, one female) rated that same 
“subordinate”.  In the low peer rating conditions, the peers assigned performance ratings of “2” (single rater 
condition) or “2”, “2” and “3” (multiple rater condition) on a scale of “1” (extremely poor) to “9” (extremely good). 
In the high peer rating conditions, peers assigned performance ratings of “8” (single rater condition) or “7”, “8” and 
“8” (multiple rater condition). In addition to assigning numerical ratings, peer raters also listed reasons to support 
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Task Performance 
 
Two levels of task performance were depicted. In the good performance condition, the “subordinate” made 
5 errors out of 40 total items, an accuracy rate of 88%. In the poor performance condition, the “subordinate” made 




Subsequent to reviewing the peer rating information, each participant completed a performance evaluation 





Participants completed measures of conscientiousness and agreeableness (9 items each) from the Big Five 
Inventory (John, Donahue & Kentle, 1991). A sample item from the agreeableness scale is “I see myself as someone 
who likes to cooperate with others”, and a sample item from the conscientious scale is “I see myself as someone 
who does a thorough job”.  All measures used a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), and 
an average of the responses was computed for each measure. Coefficient alphas were .77 and .71 for 






All manipulation check items were rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). The stimulus materials were intended to depict two levels of task performance by the 
“subordinate”. The mean response to the item “My subordinate’s performance was above average,” was 3.40 for the 
poor performance conditions, and 5.30 for good performance conditions (F=43.67; p<.001). This suggests that 
participants clearly viewed “subordinate” performance as significantly better in the good than in the poor 
performance conditions. Another goal of the experimental manipulation was that participants would consider the 
peer rating information when completing their performance appraisals. Participants responses to the statement “I 
considered the peer evaluations(s) when evaluating my “subordinate” (mean=5.60), and to the statement “The peer 
evaluations had little influence on how I rated my “subordinate” (mean=3.20) suggests that participants did indeed 
utilize the peer rating information.  
 
The means and standard deviations for all experimental conditions are shown in Table 1.  ANOVA results 
are shown in Table 2. Contrary to expectations (Hypothesis 2), the main effect for the number of peer raters (one 
versus three) was not significant. Thus, results for the single and multiple peer rating conditions were combined for 
subsequent analyses.  A main effect for peer rating information was significant (F=61.65; p<.001).  Knowledge of 
high peer ratings resulted in higher performance appraisal ratings (mean=5.86) than knowledge of low peer ratings 
(mean=4.06). A main effect was also significant for task performance, such that ratings were higher in the good 
performance condition (mean=5.58) than in the poor performance condition (mean=4.24), which further attests to 
the success of the experimental manipulation for task performance. 
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Table 1: Mean Performance Rating for Experimental Conditions 
 Task Performance 
 Poor Good 
 Peer Ratings Peer Ratings 
 Low High Low High 
Single Peer Rating 3.57 5.13 4.67 7.11 
 (1.09) (1.32) (1.30) (0.76) 
Multiple Peer Ratings 3.38 4.88 4.63 6.33 
 (0.72) (1.20) (1.26) (1.35) 
Note:  Standard deviations are shown in parentheses 
 
Table 2: Analysis of Variance for Dependent Measure 
Source df F Probability 
Main Effects    
    Peer Ratings 1 61.65 0.000 
    Task Performance 1 39.79 0.000 
    Number of Peers 1 1.90 0.171 
2-way Interaction     
    Peer Ratings x Task Performance 1 1.43 0.234 
    Number of Peers x Task Performance 1 .17 0.685 
    Number of Peers x Peer Ratings 1 .74 0.391 
3-way Interaction    
    Peer Ratings x Task Performance x    
        Number of Peers 1 0.55 0.459 
  
In support of Hypothesis 1a, in the poor performance condition, ratings assigned by raters given knowledge 
of high peer ratings were significantly higher (mean=5.00) than when (purported) peer ratings were low 
(mean=3.47; F=22.89; p<.001). In support of Hypothesis 1b, in the good performance condition, ratings assigned 
when raters were given knowledge of high peer ratings were significantly higher (mean=6.80) than when purported 
peer ratings were low (mean=4.64; F=45.34; p<.001).  
 
We also hypothesized that more agreeable and less conscientious individuals would be more influenced by 
peer rating information (hypotheses 3 and 4). Moderated regression analyses showed that results for these 




The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of peer ratings on supervisor performance 
appraisals.  Despite the increasing use of peer ratings in multi-source performance appraisal systems (e.g., Greguras, 
Robie, Schleicher & Goff, 2003), no prior empirical studies have evaluated the influence of peer ratings on 
supervisor performance ratings. We found that poor performers received significantly higher supervisor performance 
ratings when raters were told that either a single or multiple peers had rated the subordinate high than when peers 
rated the subordinate low. This finding parallels past research on the effects of self-ratings on supervisor 
performance ratings showing that high self-appraisals results in inflated supervisor ratings (Klimoski & Inks, 1990; 
Shore & Tashchian, 2007).  
 
It is noteworthy that peer ratings also influenced supervisor ratings for good performers. Performance 
ratings were significantly lower when raters had knowledge that peers had purportedly assigned low ratings to the 
subordinate than when peer ratings were high. In fact, even a single low rating by a peer significantly reduced the 
performance ratings for good performers. 
 
Past researchers have speculated that various political motives may cause a supervisor or manager to inflate 
or deflate performance ratings. Reasons for providing lenient ratings include avoiding conflict with a subordinate, 
helping the subordinate (e.g., gain a promotion) and maintaining a harmonious relationship with subordinates. 
Possible reasons for deflated performance ratings include building a record in preparation for terminating an 
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employee, setting of high standards, and sending a message that the employee needs to improve (Longenecker, et 
al., 1987). 
 
The current study shows that the mere knowledge of peer ratings is sufficient to inflate or deflate supervisor 
ratings.  This result is consistent with research showing that most people have a tendency to conform to majority 
group opinions even when the group opinion is obviously wrong (e.g., Amir, 1984; Asch, 1956).  Unlike studies of 
conformity to group opinion, in our study raters were influenced by the opinion of even a single peer (co-worker) 
rating which was clearly discrepant from actual task performance.  Our raters inflated performance ratings when the 
subordinate’s performance was moderately poor (70% accuracy) when a peer assigned a high rating (“8”), and 
deflated ratings for good performance (88% accuracy) when a peer assigned a low rating (“2).  While leniency in 
performance ratings has been well documented (e.g., Murphy & Cleveland, 1995), rating deflation is less well 
understood. Unlike inflated (i.e., lenient) performance ratings which results in employees receiving greater rewards 
than deserved, when employees receive undeserved harsh ratings, they may be denied benefits they deserved and/or 
receive penalties not warranted.  
 
We also expected that individuals who were more agreeable and less conscientious would be more likely to 
be influenced by peer ratings. Contrary to our expectations, neither of these personality characteristics were related 
to the influence of peer ratings.  These expectations were based on very limited research showing a tendency for job 
performance ratings to be more lenient when made by more agreeable and less conscientious raters (Bernardin, et 
al., 2000).  
 
A limitation of the current study is use of an undergraduate student sample.  However, there is much 
precedent for the use of students in performance appraisal research (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995).  Further, since a 
high percentage of our sample had full-time work experience, many participants could readily relate to the issues 
investigated in this study.   
 
In summary, this is the first known empirical study to demonstrate that supervisor performance appraisals 
are distorted when raters are provided with peer (co-worker) ratings.  Peer ratings were found to result in both 
inflated and deflated supervisor performance ratings.  Further, these effects were similar when raters were provided 
with either a single or multiple peer ratings.  Given the growing trend in the use of multi-source performance 
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